Section 29A Revisited: Supreme Court’s Triple Rulings on Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
In a significant development for India’s arbitration framework, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently delivered three landmark rulings on Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Act‘).
In Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule and Ors.1Judgment dated 29 January 2026 in SLP (C) No(s). 10944-10945 of 2025 (‘Jagdeep Chowgule’), the Court held that applications seeking extension of time to conclude arbitral proceedings must be filed before the principal civil court, even if the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court. In C. Velusamy v. K Indhera2Judgment dated 03 February 2026 in SLP (C) No(s). 6551 of 2025 (‘C.Velusamy’), the Court clarified that an arbitrator’s mandate can be extended under Section 29A(5) even after an award has been rendered beyond the statutory deadline, thereby ensuring that procedural lapses do not automatically nullify arbitral outcomes. In Mohan Lal Fatehpuri v. M/s Bharat Textiles32025 SCC OnLine SC 2754 (‘Mohan Lal Fatehpuri’), the Supreme Court explained that the arbitrator automatically becomes “functus officio” once the statutory period prescribed under Section 29A(1), read with all the permissible exclusions and extensions, expires. Thus, any continuation of the arbitrator’s mandate without seeking an appropriate order under Section 29A will be impermissible in law. Together, these rulings provide greater judicial clarity on the ambit of Section 29A, striking a balance between the goal of expeditious arbitration and the need for appropriate judicial supervision.
I. No Hierarchical Interpretation of ‘Court’ under Section 29A of the Act
The Supreme Court, in Jagdeep Chowgule, has conclusively resolved the long-standing debate over the interpretation of the term ‘Court’ under Section 29A of the Act, particularly in matters involving court-appointed arbitrators.
The controversy stems from the assumption, adopted by several High Courts, that once an arbitrator is appointed by the High Court or the Supreme Court, those courts retain a continuing supervisory role over the arbitral proceedings, including the power to extend the arbitral mandate under Section 29A. The Supreme Court categorically rejected this premise, observing that it is a misconception to assume that the Section 11 court keeps a watch on the conduct of arbitral proceedings or on the making of the arbitral award, like Orwell’s Big Brother is watching you.’ The Court clarified that the jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act is exhausted upon the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and that the appointing court thereafter becomes functus officio, with no residual supervisory control over the arbitral process.
This intervention became necessary due to divergent views expressed by various High Courts. One stream of judgments held that ‘Court’ under Section 29A of the Act must be understood strictly in terms of Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, i.e., the principal civil court of original jurisdiction (or a High Court with ordinary original jurisdiction), regardless of whether the arbitral tribunal was constituted by the Supreme Court, the High Court under Section 11(6), or by party consent under Section 11(2).4Mormugao Port Trust v. Ganesh Benzoplast Ltd, Judgment dated 15.01.2020 in W.P. No. 3 of 2020 (High Court of Bombay at Goa); M/s A’xykno Capital Services Private Limited v. State of UP 2023 SCC OnLine All 2991; Dr. VV Subbarao v. Dr. Appa Rao Mukkamala and Ors 2024 SCC OnLine AP 1668 The second stream of judgments, however, adopted a contextual interpretation, disavowing Section 2(1)(e) in favour of continuity of jurisdiction.5Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel v. Bhanubhai Ramanbhai Patel 2018 SCC OnLine Guj 5017; Cabra Instalaciones Y. Servicios v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. 2019 SCC Online Bom 1437; DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co. 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2501; Amit Kumar Gupta v. Dipak Prasad 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 2174; Magnus Opus IT Consulting Pvt Ltd v. Artcad Systems 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 2861; Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative Limited v. Manish Engineering Enterprises 2022 SCC OnLine All 150; Best Eastern Business House Pvt. Ltd. v. Mina Pradhan 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 7997; Ovington Finance Pvt Ltd. v. Bindiya Naga 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8765; K.I.P.L. Vistacore Infra Projects J.V. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ichalkarnj 2024 SCC Online Bom 327; M/S Geo Miller Company Private Limited v. UP Jal Nigam and Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine All 1676; Best Eastern Business House Pvt. Ltd. v. Mina Pradhan 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 7997; M/s. Premco Rail Engineering Ltd. v. Indian Institute of Technology, Indore Arbitration Case No. 88 of 2025 (High Court of Madhya Pradesh) These decisions relied on Section 42 of the Act to argue that once the High Court had appointed an arbitrator under Section 11(6), all subsequent applications, including those under Section 29A, must be filed before the same court. They also invoked the opening phrase of Section 2(1), ‘unless the context otherwise requires,’ to justify a departure from the general definition of ‘Court.’
The Supreme Court disapproved this interpretative approach that sought to read hierarchy or institutional status into the determination of jurisdiction under Section 29A of the Act. In emphatic terms, the Supreme Court held that interpreting a statute based on a perception of the status or hierarchy of courts, when none is provided in the statute, is contrary to the fundamental conception of the rule of law. In this context, the Court aptly quoted Dicey’s celebrated formulation that “however high you may be, the law is above you,” and the seminal decision in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak61988 2 SCC 602, where it was held that jurisdiction cannot be assumed on considerations of superiority or institutional stature, but must strictly emanate from statutory conferment.
This interpretational conflict had earlier been addressed in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD v. BSC & C JV72024 SCC OnLine SC 1801, where the Supreme Court held that the power under Section 29A(4) vests in the court defined under Section 2(1)(e), and that the power of substitution under Section 29A(6) is merely consequential. Yet, High Courts continued to distinguish BSC & C JV on the ground that the arbitrator in that case was appointed by consent rather than by the High Court under Section 11, thereby perpetuating uncertainty.
The issue resurfaced in Viva Infraventure Pvt. Ltd. v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority82025 SCC OnLine Del 468, where the Delhi High Court declined jurisdiction over a Section 29A application. The application for extension of the arbitral mandate had been filed before the Delhi High Court owing to an erroneous reading of a procedural order that mentioned Delhi as the ‘seat’ of arbitration, despite the fact that the arbitrator had been appointed by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court and the dispute resolution clause conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the courts at Gautam Budh Nagar. The Supreme Court, while upholding the judgment of the Delhi High Court, extended the arbitral mandate in the interest of justice but clarified that future applications must be filed before the competent court at Gautam Budh Nagar.
Thus, by applying the above principles, the Supreme Court held that the definition of ‘Court’ under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act is exhaustive and binding for the purposes of Part I of the Act, including Section 29A of the Act. The Court found no contextual compulsion warranting a departure from the statutory definition. It rejected the argument that permitting civil or commercial courts to extend the arbitral mandate would result in a jurisdictional anomaly or conflict of powers, holding that such concerns are rooted in perception rather than statutory design.
Answering to the issues raised in relation to the applicability of Section 42, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision in State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors9(2015) 1 SCC 32, which held that solely because a superior court appoints the arbitrator, it cannot be regarded as a ‘Court’ of first instance for the purposes of Section 42 of the Act. In reinforcing this conclusion, the Supreme Court placed reliance on its earlier judgments in State of Jharkhand and Ors. v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.102018 2 SCC 602 and Nimet Resources Inc. v. Essar Steels Ltd.11(2009) 17 SCC 313 which affirm that proceedings relating to continuation, termination, or substitution of an arbitral mandate fall within the domain of curial supervision by the ‘Court’ as defined under Section 2(1)(e), and that the special and limited jurisdiction exercised under Section 11 does not attract the operation of Section 42 of the Act.
As regards the definition in Section 2(1)(e), which is prefaced by the phrase ‘unless the context otherwise requires’, it indicates that the term ‘Court’ includes the High Court only where explicitly required by the Act. As such, wherever the legislature intended to delineate jurisdictions, requisite provisions have been duly made, as exemplified through Sections 47 and 57 of the Act, whereby jurisdiction of Civil Courts is expressly excluded. In any event, Section 29A of the Act stipulates no distinction between arbitrators appointed with the consent of the parties or by courts under Section 11 of the Act.
On this basis, the Supreme Court concluded that applications seeking extension of time under Section 29A of the Act must be filed before the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction, as the case may be, irrespective of whether the arbitrator was appointed by the parties or by the High Court or Supreme Court under Section 11 of the Act. The decision decisively settles a long-standing jurisdictional debate that had fragmented judicial opinion across High Courts. By restoring primacy to the statutory definition of ‘Court’ under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, the Supreme Court has emphatically affirmed legislative mandate over judicially crafted interpretations.
II. Award Does Not Mean End: Post-Award Applications under Section 29A(5) Maintainable
The Supreme Court in C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera12Judgment dated 03 February 2026 in SLP (C) No(s). 6551 of 2025 was called upon to decide whether a court may entertain an application under Section 29A (5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to extend the mandate of an arbitral tribunal even after the statutory period has expired and an award has already been rendered.
In its detailed exposition of Section 29A, the Supreme Court synthesised earlier rulings, including Rohan Builders13Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd, v. Berger Paints India Ltd. 2024 SCC Online SC 2494 (‘Rohan Builders ’), Lancor Holdings14Lancor Holdings Ltd. v. Prem Kumar Menon & Ors. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2319 (‘Lancor Holdings’), and Jagdeep Chowgule, to clarify the structure and purpose of Section 29A. The Court emphasised that mere delay in the delivery of an award is not sufficient to set it aside. The judgment then addressed the crucial question of whether an application for extension is barred once an award has been delivered after the expiry of the mandate.
The Supreme Court held that Section 29A contains no such prohibition. An award made after expiry of the mandate is “non est” in the sense that it is unenforceable under Section 36 of the Act, and need not be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. The arbitrator’s indiscretion in delivering such an award does not deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to extend the mandate. The phrase “if an award is not made” in subsection (4) is contextual, intended to empower the Court to extend time before or after expiry, not to foreclose jurisdiction once an award is rendered.
The Supreme Court clarified that an arbitrator’s indiscretion in delivering an award after the expiry of the mandate does not impair the court’s jurisdiction to consider an extension. Such an award, however, remains ineffective and unenforceable until the court decides on the extension.
In its reasoning, the Madras High Court had relied on precedents such as Suryadev Alloys & Power Private Ltd. v. Sh. Govindaraja Textiles Pvt. Ltd152020 SCC Online Mad 7858, which had held that the 1996 Act does not empower courts to enlarge time after an award is made, unlike the 1940 Act. Reliance was also placed on Ayyasamy v. A. Shanmugavel162024 SCC Online Mad 4338, which similarly held that courts cannot extend the mandate post‑award.
Rejecting reliance on Rohan Builders, the -, Madras High Court held that the precedent only clarified the timing of applications under Section 29A, permitting them even after expiry of the initial twelve-month or extended six-month period, but not in cases where an award had already been passed. It distinguished Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager172024 SCC Online SC 3381, noting that in that case no award had been made and the Court was concerned only with sufficient cause for extension.
The Supreme Court, however, adopted a broader interpretation. It emphasized that Section 29A was introduced to curb delays but not to frustrate arbitration altogether. The Law Commission had recommended timelines to ensure efficiency, but judicial intervention was designed to facilitate the continuation rather than the termination of proceedings. The Supreme Court underscored Parliament’s intent to secure arbitral proceedings and ensure they culminate in a binding award. Provisions such as continuation of proceedings pending extension applications and seamless transition upon substitution of arbitrators demonstrate this legislative purpose. While concerns were raised that permitting extensions even after awards could foster indiscipline, the Court rejected this apprehension, clarifying that there is no automatic extension; discretion lies with the Court, which must scrutinise the facts closely before granting relief. While granting extensions in such cases, the Court may take into account other factors, such as a reduction in the arbitrator’s fee under the proviso to Section 29A(4) of the Act, and may impose costs on the parties if the situation so demands. The court also retains the discretion to substitute the arbitrator, though this power must be exercised with caution.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that Section 29A must not be interpreted to infer a threshold bar against applications under subsection (5) even where an award has been passed after expiry of the mandate. The constitutional obligation of courts is to interpret remedial provisions in a manner that ensures accessibility, affordability, expeditiousness, and cohesiveness. In deciding such an application, the court must assess whether sufficient cause exists for extension and may impose appropriate terms and conditions as provided under the Act.
III. Arbitrator’s Mandate Terminates on Expiry of Time, Substituted Arbitrator Must Resume After Extension
A significant clarification regarding the powers under Section 29A(6) of the Act was provided in Mohan Lal Fatehpuri, wherein the Supreme Court held that the power of substitution under Section 29A(6) is independent and broader than the powers under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. The Supreme Court emphasised that Section 29A was inserted into the Act in response to widespread criticism of delays in conducting arbitration proceedings, as such delays are contrary to the avowed object of the Act, i.e., the speedy resolution of disputes. Further, the Supreme Court emphasised that Section 29A is remedial in nature, the mandate of the arbitrator shall terminate, unless the court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period.
The Supreme Court explained that the rejection of earlier applications for termination or substitution under Sections 14 and 15 does not bar the court from exercising its jurisdiction under Section 29A(6). This provision operates in a separate field, intended to enforce strict compliance with deadlines in arbitration proceedings. However, the fact remains that, upon expiry of the initial period or the extended period, the arbitrator cannot proceed with the arbitration and his mandate terminates, subject to an order that may be passed by the Court in a proceeding under Section 29A(4) of the Act.
The Supreme Court, while referring to the interpretation of the term ‘terminate’ in Section 29A(4) in the case of Rohan Builders, held that on expiry of the initial period of six months and the extended period of six months, the arbitral tribunal becomes functus officio but not in absolute terms. Further, termination of the arbitral mandate is conditional upon the filing of an application for extension and cannot be treated as termination stricto sensu.
The Supreme Court further held that once the statutory period prescribed under Section 29A(1), read with permissible exclusions and extensions, expires, the arbitrator automatically becomes “functus officio”. Although the term “terminate”, which has been used in the Section, shall not be construed strictly, the arbitrator cannot continue the arbitration proceedings, as a matter of right, after the expiration of the statutory timeline. Unless the court passes an appropriate order under Section 29A, mere continuation without obtaining a valid extension is impermissible in law. Further, the Supreme Court pointed towards Section 29A(6) and (7), which mandate that the proceedings shall continue from the stage already reached. This mandate balances the need for systemic accountability with procedural efficiency. Thus, the proper exercise of jurisdiction was construed to be “substitution” rather than extension. This would give proper effect to the scheme and objective of the Act, which aims at the speedy resolution and the prevention of the continuation of proceedings by an arbitrator whose mandate had lapsed.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the rulings in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, and Mohan Lal Fatehpuri v. M/S Bharat Textiles mark a significant evolution in the jurisprudence surrounding Section 29A of the Act. Some may argue that the interpretations rendered in these rulings may be textually justified but detached from the practical realities of arbitration practice and the hierarchical mindset prevalent in the functioning of courts, especially in non-metropolitan regions. Together, these judgments underscore a pragmatic and purposive interpretation of Section 29A of the Act, aligning Indian arbitration law with international best practices and ensuring that the arbitral process remains both disciplined and time-bound.
Recent Post
